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DANIEL P. ToKAJI*
"If we have to decide the question, then representative government has
failed. "
This Supreme Court's decision to strike down Seattle's and Louisville's
voluntary desegregation plans is significant not only for public education but
also for American democracy. Parents Involved in Community Schools v.
Seattle School District, No. 1 2 will undoubtedly make the already
formidable challenge of promoting racially integrated learning environments
even more daunting. Less obvious, but perhaps ultimately more important,
are Parents Involved's implications for democratic governance and the role
of the federal courts in sustaining and constraining it. As someone whose
main focus is election law rather than education law, I focus here on what
the decision says-and, more to the point, what it does not say-about
democracy.
Parents Involved overrules decisions of democratically elected school
boards, made after years of trial-and-error experience in trying to integrate
public schools. Yet missing from the majority Justices' opinions is a
persuasive justification for the federal judiciary's substitution of its own
judgment regarding the costs and benefits of race-conscious integration
programs for those made by fairly elected local school boards. This omission
betrays a deeper failure of the Rehnquist and now the Roberts Court to
develop a functional theory of the role of the federal judiciary in democratic
self-government, one that takes into account the circumstances under which
political institutions can and cannot be trusted. The Court's rejection of
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1 Justice Robert A. Jackson, 1953, on Brown v. Board of Education, in MICHAEL
J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CrVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 308 (2004) (quoting Justice Robert A. Jackson's
papers). See also Brad Snyder, What Would Justice Holmes Do (WWJHD)?
Rehnquist's Plessy Memo, Majoritarianism, and Parents Involved, 69 OHIO ST. L.J
873 (2008). I am indebted to Snyder for calling attention to Justice Jackson's
quotation, as well as the memo on the desegregation cases by his then-law clerk
William Rehnquist (see infra note 121), during the symposium.
2 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
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plans developed by local officials is thus related to the incoherence of the
Court's election law jurisprudence, upon which scholars of varying
perspectives have remarked.3
For those who recall the days when "states' rights" was the rallying cry
of the most ardent segregationists, the mere mention of local control over
public education is sure to have an unfriendly if not heretical ring to it. So
too, those accustomed to seeing federal judges as heroes in the struggle for
racial equality may find suspicion of their powers unwelcome. The federal
judiciary's aggressive superintendence of the decisions of local school
boards was, after all, critical to dismantling de jure segregation in the South
and elsewhere. There is, however, an unmistakable difference. Brown and
the cases that followed did not lightly overrule the educational decisions of
democratically elected school boards. These cases instead required the Court
to consider whether, in Justice Jackson's words, "representative government
ha[d] failed." And failed it most definitely had. At the time that the Court
decided Brown and for years thereafter, African Americans were largely
excluded from elected political bodies at all levels of government, from local
school boards to Congress. 4 In fact, they were prevented from voting
entirely throughout the South. 5 This massive democratic breakdown
justified both the Brown decision and the extended federal judicial
intervention that was ultimately required to dismantle the regime of de jure
segregation.
There is no comparable justification for the Court's second-guessing of
the decisions made by elected officials in Louisville and Seattle. In fact, the
Court does not even attempt to justify its intervention on anything that might,
even in the most generous light, be considered a theory of democracy and the
role of federal courts in safeguarding it. To be sure, the Court's decision to
strike down these programs finds precedential support in the line of
decisions in which the Court has applied heightened scrutiny to
race-conscious affirmative action programs, whether motivated by the most
noxious racism or a desire to reverse a long history of unequal treatment. 6
But at least since City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,7 the Court has made
no serious attempt to ground its discrimination doctrine in democratic theory.
Parents Involved extends and exacerbates this omission, failing to consider
3 See Daniel P. Tokaji, Leave It to the Lower Courts: On Judicial Intervention in
Election Administration, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1065, 1065-66 & nn.1-6 (2007) (citing
commentary on the Supreme Court's incoherent election law jurisprudence).
4 See infra notes 24-35 and accompanying text.
5 See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
6 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290 (1978).
7 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989).
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whether representative government had failed in Seattle or Louisville, much
less to articulate standards under which claims of democratic failure might
be evaluated.
This Essay examines the roots and offshoots of this failure. Part I
assesses the desegregation cases starting with Brown, arguing that the failure
of democracy justified the aggressive judicial intervention that was
necessary to dismantle segregation in public schools. Part II discusses
Parents Involved in light of the discrimination precedents on which the
majority Justices' opinions are grounded, focusing on the Court's failure to
justify its overruling of democratically elected school boards. Part III
considers the implications of Parents Involved for democracy, suggesting
that the future of progressive reform for those concerned with educational
equality lies not with the federal judiciary but with the political branches of
federal, state, and local governments.
I. DESEGREGATION
The first part of my argument is that the exclusion of African Americans
from electoral politics was a critical component of the justification for the
line of desegregation cases starting with Brown. A premise of this argument
is that federal courts should take a functional and institutional perspective in
determining whether to override decisions made by democratically elected
bodies such as school boards.8 Specifically, they should consider whether
there are reasons to distrust the process by which governmental bodies make
their decisions, either because certain groups have been excluded from it or
because that process has been distorted by prejudice or some other systemic
unfairness.
My argument thus draws upon the process-based theory of constitutional
adjudication most famously stated in Footnote Four of Carolene Products9
and, just as famously, developed and defended in John Hart Ely's classic
Democracy and Distrust.'0 The basic idea is that there are compelling
reasons to distrust the products of the political process, and therefore for
courts to intervene on constitutional grounds, in two types of
8 See Richard H. Pildes, Foreword. The Constitutionalization of Democratic
Politics, 118 HARv. L. REv. 28, 41 (2004) (viewing "constitutional oversight of
democratic politics as a functional problem in institutional design").
9 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)
[hereinafter Footnote Four].
10 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEw (1980).
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circumstances. I I One is when certain groups are excluded from elections or
governance. This idea is described in the second paragraph of Footnote Four,
which refers to restrictions on "those political processes which can
ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation."'12
Where access to the political process is not open to all, there may be grounds
for judicial intervention. The other circumstance is when certain groups'
interests are systematically rejected despite the groups' formal ability to
participate. The third paragraph of Footnote Four captures this idea, in its
reference to "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities... which
tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes."'1 3 For
Ely, discrimination against African Americans was the classic example in
which a breakdown in the democratic process necessitated federal judicial
intervention. 14 The widespread exclusion of African Americans from
politics in the South, combined with the rampant racial prejudice that
prevented Blacks from participating as equals even when they were
enfranchised, justified the Court's decision to intervene in Brown and its
progeny.
This is not the place for an extended defense of the Carolene Products
theory of constitutional adjudication and its relevance to the desegregation
cases, a point that has been more than adequately elaborated by Ely and
subsequent commentators. 15 Three qualifications on my reliance on this
theory here should, however, be noted.
The first is that I do not claim that defects in the political process are the
only thing that courts should take into consideration in determining how
closely to scrutinize the products of a democratically elected body's
decision-making process. Courts need not turn a blind eye to text, original
intent, fundamental rights, or other potential bases for interpreting the
Constitution. But the countermajoritarian difficulty should be taken seriously.
Thus, when courts apply heightened scrutiny, they should provide some
justification for why the elected bodies' weighing of costs and benefits is not
to be trusted. My claim, then, is not that all other theories must give way to
process theory. It is, more modestly, that defects in the political process are
among the things that a court should consider in deciding whether to strike
down the products of that process.
The second qualification is that my argument does not require
11 See Michael J. Klarnan, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory,
77 VA. L. REv. 747, 784 (1991).
12304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
13 Id.
14 ELY, supra note 10, at 135.
15 See Klarman, supra note 11, at 768-819.
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acceptance of the controversial proposition that political process theory can
avoid substantive value judgments. 16 Rather, it concedes that, in assessing
whether there is a problem with democratic processes sufficient to warrant
judicial intervention, courts must rely on some baseline conception of what a
fair political process would look like. This can properly be deemed a
substantive judgment about the political process, insofar as it entails a
normative conception of democratic politics.
This concession to process theory's critics does not make it difficult to
justify Brown, or even the later decisions that finally helped make its vision
of desegregated public schools a reality. Whatever one's conception of a fair
democratic process, there can be no denying that the processes through
which segregation was adopted and maintained were grossly unfair.
Throughout the South, Blacks were prevented even from participating in
electoral politics, from elections to the local school board to the election of
members of Congress and the President. 17 Even after African Americans
were permitted to vote in large numbers in the former Confederate states
after the Voting Rights Act of 1965, their influence was systemically diluted
through practices such as at-large elections and gerrymandered boundaries.' 8
Brown and its progeny are justified by this pervasive breakdown in fair
democratic processes-including the outright denial of the vote, as well as
its dilution-that persisted for years after the Court declared de facto
segregation unconstitutional. 19 Representative democracy had failed, in
Justice Jackson's words, and quite dismally. Indeed, the near-total
disfranchisement of southern Blacks, from the nineteenth through the second
16 For criticism of the idea that process theory can avoid substantive value
judgments, see Laurence Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based
Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980), and Mark Tushnet, Darkness on
the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89
YALE L.J. 1037 (1980). For a response, see Klarman, supra note 11, at 782-88.
17 For a thorough discussion of the disfranchisement of African Americans in
this period, see J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS:
SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH,
1880-1910(1974).
18 See J. MORGAN KOUSSER, COLORBLIND INJUSTICE: MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS
AND THE UNDOING OF THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION 37-38, 55-58 (1999);
BERNARD GROFMAN ET AL., MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST FOR
VOTING EQUALITY 23-24 (1992); Pamela Karlan, The Impact of the Voting Rights
Act on African Americans: Second- and Third-Generation Issues, in VOTING RIGHTS
AND REDISTRICTING IN THE UNITED STATES 121, 122 (Mark E. Rush ed.).
19 See GROFMAN, ET AL., supra note 18, at 15, 21-23; ALEXANDER KEYSSAR,
THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED
STATES 257-66, 287-94 (2000).
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half of the twentieth century, is the quintessential breakdown of the
democratic process, whatever one's conception of discrimination or
democracy.
This leads to the third qualification in my reliance on process-based
theory: It depends only on the second paragraph of Footnote Four, and not
on the third.20 One need not accept the idea that "prejudice" warrants
heightened scrutiny in order to believe that heightened scrutiny is justified
when minorities' access to the political process is denied. At the time that
Brown was decided and for many years thereafter, there were (to borrow
from the second paragraph of Footnote Four) formidable "restrict[ions on]
those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about the
repeal of undesirable legislation." 2' Starting with the end of Reconstruction
and continuing through the enactment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
southern states maintained a variety of now-familiar devices-including
literacy tests, all-White primaries, and poll taxes, not to mention threats of
violence for those who even attempted to register-as means of excluding
African Americans from the polling place. 22
There is no doubt that, at the time of Brown and for many years
thereafter, Blacks were shut out of Southern politics. In fact, White
Democrats were remarkably explicit about their motives for erecting barriers
to democratic participation. An example is a speech by former North
Carolina Governor Charles Aycock, who led the fight for amendments to
that state's constitution that were designed to keep Blacks from voting in
1900. After these amendments were enacted into law, he said:
I am proud of my State, moreover, because there we have solved the
negro problem.. .. We have taken him out of politics and have thereby
secured good government under any party and laid foundations for the
future development of both races....
I am inclined to give to you our solution to this problem. It is, first, as
far as possible under the Fifteenth Amendment to disfranchise him; after that
let him alone, quit writing about him; quit talking about him .... Let the
negro learn once for all that there is unending separation of the races.., that
they cannot intermingle; let the white man determine that no man shall by
act or thought or speech cross this line, and the race problem will be at an
20 For a fuller development of this point, see Klarman, supra note 11, at
788-819.
21 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
22 See KOUSSER, supra note 18, at 25 (listing devices used to keep Blacks from
voting); Richard H. Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, 17 CONST.
COMMENT. 295, 302 (2000) ("The white-supremacy purposes of these new [state]
constitutions were not disguised.").
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end. 23
North Carolina was the last of the states of the former Confederacy to
enact such disenfranchising devices.24 African Americans, who had been
elected to all levels of government in large numbers during and after
Reconstruction, were completely shut out.25 For most of the twentieth
century, well after the Supreme Court's decision in Brown, these devices
remained in place. 26 There is no question that there were intentionally
created and practically insurmountable barriers to Blacks' ability to
participate in elections and get elected to office, before and after Brown.2 7
While disfranchising practices were most egregious in the South, Blacks also
faced barriers to equal participation and representation elsewhere in the
country.28
We cannot know for sure whether Brown would have been necessary if
Blacks had enjoyed access to the ballot and to public office throughout these
years, but it is at least possible that it would not have been. As Michael
Klarman has described, access to the ballot was helpful in protecting African
Americans' interests during and even after the Reconstruction era. 29 Later,
after the Great Migration, ballot access helped Blacks protect their interests
23 Charles B. Aycock, Speech Before the North Carolina Society, Baltimore
(Dec. 18, 1903), in THE NORTH CAROLINA EXPERIENCE: AN INTERPRETIVE AND
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 415 (Lindley S. Butler & Alan D. Watson eds., 1984),
quoted in Brief for Congressional Black Caucus as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Appellees, Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996) (Nos. 94-923, 94-924), at 13-14,
available at 1995 WL 702802.
24 See Daniel P. Tokaji, The Story of Shaw v. Reno: Representation and
Raceblindness, in RACE LAW STORIES 497, 501-04 (2008).
25 KOUSSER, COLORBLIND INJUSTICE, supra note 18, at 16-38; J MORGAN
KoUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION AND THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH 45-82 (1974); Pildes, supra note 22, at
303-04.
26 KOUSSER, COLORBLIND INJUSTICE, supra note 18, at 19, 53-58 (discussing the
Supreme Court's complicity in the disenfranchisement of Blacks); Chandler
Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief History, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY
VOTING 7, 10-24 (Bernard Grofrnan & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992); Pildes supra
note 22, at 310.
27 KEYSSAR, supra note 19, at 257-68; KOUSSER, COLORBLIND INJUSTICE, supra
note 18, at 13, 21-24.
28 KEYSSAR, supra note 19, at 236; Daniel P. Tokaji, Voter Registration and
Election Reform, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 453 (2008).
29 Klarman, supra note 11, at 790.
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in northern cities. 30 It is at least conceivable that, in a world where Blacks
enjoyed equal voting rights, the massive intrusion into state and local
democracy that was required to dismantle de jure segregation would not
have been necessary. 3 1 More importantly, the onerous restrictions on
African American voting rights before and after Brown certainly made it
more difficult to dismantle desegregation. 32 Accordingly, the denial of
Blacks' access to the political process justifies the result in Brown, even if
one entirely rejects Carolene Products's idea that prejudice may distort the
political process (and thus justify judicial intervention) even when minority
groups have equal access to the political process.33
The defects in the democratic process also justify the Court's
intervention in later cases like Green v. County School Board, in which the
Court demanded the "root and branch" dismantling of de jure segregation. 34
A decade after Brown, public schools in the states of the old Confederacy
remained almost entirely segregated. 35 Given Blacks' almost complete
exclusion from polling places throughout this period, it is not difficult to see
why. The "massive resistance" among southern Whites was easily sufficient
to overcome what little political power Blacks had in this period. It also
justifies the Court's more aggressive posture toward southern intransigence,
embodied in Green.
A focus on defects in the democratic process also helps explain the
Court's increasing deference to local school boards, starting in the 1970s.36
As Blacks gained voting rights in the South, the Court's posture toward the
decisions made by democratic institutions became more deferential. Justice
30 Id. at 795.
3 11d. at 807, 813.
32 Id. at 803-04.
33 To be clear, my claim is not that the Court in Brown and the cases that
followed consciously justified their own actions in terms of correcting the political
process. It is that, regardless of the Justices' motivations, these cases can be justified
on this ground. See ELY, supra note 10, at 73-75.
34 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968).
35 KLARMAN, supra note 11, at 349; JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 1124 (9th ed. 2001).
36 See Deborah N. Archer, Moving Beyond Strict Scrutiny: The Need for a More
Nuanced Standard of Equal Protection Analysis for K Through 12 Integration
Programs, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 629, 640 (2007); Enid Trucious-Haynes & Cedric
Merlin Powell, The Rhetoric of Colorblind Constitutionalism: Individualism, Race,
and Public Schools in Louisville, Kentucky, 112 PENN ST. L. REv. 947, 969 (2008).
For more on the Court's history of deference to local school districts, see Danielle
Holley-Walker, Educating at the Crossroads: Parents Involved, No Child Left
Behind, and School Choice, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 911 (2008).
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Breyer's dissent in Parents Involved reminds us that Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education emphasized school authorities'
"broad power to formulate and implement educational policy." 37 Three
years later, in Milliken v. Bradley, this emphasis on local control caused the
Court to reject a federal court order requiring interdistrict busing between
Detroit and neighboring districts. 38 In rejecting this plan, Chief Justice
Burger's opinion for the majority famously remarked that: "No single
tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local control over
the operation of schools .... ,,39 The Milliken majority explicitly worried
that district courts would become "a defacto 'legislative authority to resolve
these complex questions, and then the 'school superintendent' for the entire
area," a task that "few, if any, judges are qualified to perform and one which
would deprive the people of control of schools through their elected
representatives. '40 As hyperbolic as this remark may be, it expresses the
Court's respect for the decisions of local democratic bodies which would
remain prominent in subsequent years as the federal courts gradually
withdrew from their aggressive superintendence of the public schools.
This is not to say that Milliken or other cases upholding local school
boards' authority were correctly decided, nor is it to deny that the increasing
conservatism of the Burger and then Rehnquist Courts was a key reason for
the Court's greater deference to local school boards' decisions. It should be
acknowledged, however, that as Blacks gained the right to vote and were
able to elect representatives of their choice to office, there was greater
justification for the federal courts backing away. There is a strong argument
to be made that the Court backed off too quickly starting in the 1970s,
overestimating Blacks' ability to obtain equal educational opportunities
through ordinary political processes like local school boards, state
legislatures, and Congress. This is particularly true if we take into account
vote-diluting practices that persisted long after Blacks enjoyed the formal
right to vote, and undoubtedly weakened their ability to pursue educational
37 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2801 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971)); see
also N.C. Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45 (1971) (noting school authorities'
"wide discretion in formulating school policy," in the exercise of which they "may
well conclude that some kind of racial balance in the schools is desirable quite apart
from any constitutional requirements").
38 418 U.S. 717, 719-20 (1974).
39 Id. at 741.
40 Id. at 743-44. For a discussion of the constitutional dimension of Milliken's
"professed respect for local control," see David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley's
City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 487, 568-69 (1999).
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equality opportunities through local school boards, state legislatures, and
Congress.41 My point is not that the Court was correct to retreat from
aggressive superintendence of desegregation efforts in Milliken and cases
that followed.42 It is simply that, as African Americans' political power
increased-and with it their ability to protect their interests through
democratically elected bodies-the weight of the arguments for overriding
the decisions of state and local political bodies decreased.
Taken together, the implication of these cases is that the ordinary
processes of state and local government could be trusted to weigh the
competing values at stake in the desegregation debate, so long as they
remained open to all comers. As those bodies became more representative of
the communities that they served, by virtue of the greater protection afforded
the voting rights of minorities, the argument for withdrawing judicial
oversight became more persuasive.
II. DISCRIMINATION
If Brown and the desegregation cases that followed it were the only
relevant precedents, then the Court's decision in Parents Involved would
have been an easy one. With their emphasis on deference to democratically
elected bodies, the desegregation cases support the conclusion that the
school boards in Louisville and Seattle should have been afforded latitude in
balancing the competing values at play in the debate over race-conscious
remedies for de facto segregation.
There was no persuasive argument for a federal court invalidating the
plans in Louisville and Seattle based on defects in the political process
through which these policies were enacted and retained. The Seattle and
Louisville plans, after all, were the product of fairly elected school boards
that were open to all comers-both in the selection of their members and in
their deliberations. There was, moreover, no plausible claim that a
disfavored minority was shut out of the process. That was especially true
given that Whites constitute a majority of citizens in Jefferson County,
Kentucky, and a plurality in Seattle. 43 Although opponents of
41 See Davidson, supra note 26, at 24-27; Vikram David Amar & Alan
Brownstein, The Hybrid Nature of Political Rights, 50 STAN. L. REV. 915, 922
(1998); John C. Ruoff & Herbert E. Buhl, Voting Rights in South Carolina:
1982-2006, 17 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 643, 705 (2008).
4 2 See, e.g., Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976); Bd.
of Educ. of Okla. City v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S.
70(1995).
43 See Robert S. Chang & Catherine E. Smith, John Calmore 's America, 86 N.C.
L. REV. 739, 744 n.18 (2008); Tal Klement & Elizabeth Siggins, A Window of
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race-conscious integration efforts lost their battle in both places, they had no
claim that they were denied fair and equal access to their school boards. Nor
was there evidence upon which one could argue that the democratic
processes of these groups were distorted by prejudice, so as to deny White
students (or anyone else opposing the districts' desegregation policies) a fair
shake. As a matter of process-based theory, then, the decision is
indefensible.
Of course, there is a line of case authority that provides strong
precedential support for the decision in Parents Involved. That is the line of
discrimination cases from Bakke to Croson to Grutter and Gratz, which hold
that race-conscious affirmative action programs are presumptively
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. 44 Parents Involved thus
presents a collision between the desegregation cases' emphasis on local
control, and the affirmative action cases' emphasis on raceblindness as an
end in itself.
Before exploring the democratic deficiency in Parents Involved, it is
first helpful to set forth the precedent-based argument for striking down the
Louisville and Seattle plans. If we put aside the post-Brown desegregation
cases, as well as any concerns about the Court overriding decisions of
democratically elected bodies, that argument is actually quite
straightforward. 45 It goes something like this:
1.) Under established precedent, all racial classifications are subject to
strict scrutiny.46 That is true regardless of whether the law or practice in
question is deemed inclusive or exclusive, and regardless of whether its
alleged purposes are invidious or benign.47 There is no dispute that both the
Seattle and Louisville plans took race into consideration in making student
Opportunity: Addressing the Complexities of the Relationship Between Drug
Enforcement and Racial Disparity in Seattle, 1 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 165,
176-77 (2002).
44 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
244, 270 (2003); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 491-95 (1989);
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290 (1978).
45 For this point, I can cite personal experience. At the start of this symposium,
the Ohio State Law Journal staged a re-creation of the oral argument in Parents
Involved, with a student and a professor assigned to argue each side. I was one of the
participants in this moot court, assigned to argue Petitioners' side-undoubtedly the
easier one, in light of the precedent discussed in the footnotes that follow.
4 6 See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505-06 (2005); Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).
47 See Johnson, 543 U.S. at 505; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326; Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); Croson, 488 U.S. at 500.
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assignments.48 They are therefore racial classifications and may be upheld
only if narrowly tailored to a compelling interest.
2.) The Supreme Court has never held racial balancing alone to be a
compelling interest under strict scrutiny, but instead has only sustained
"diversity" as a rationale when part of an overall plan to increase student
diversity-including but not limited to racial diversity-in higher
education. 49 That is not the case with respect to either district's plan, which
only seeks to achieve racial diversity, not some broader goal of diversity that
goes beyond race.
3.) Even assuming that there is a compelling interest in achieving a racial
balance within the schools, neither plan is narrowly tailored to this end.
Seattle's plan crudely separates students into two groups, White and
non-White, and then assigns a preference until schools are within a fixed
numerical range. 50 Louisville's plan categorizes students as Black or not
Black, and requires non-magnet schools to maintain an enrollment between
fifteen and fifty percent Black, with the exact criteria for assigning students
otherwise ill-defined. 51 Both programs lack the individualized treatment that
was the hallmark of the affirmative action program upheld in Grutter,52
which distinguished that program from the one struck down in Gratz.53
Neither school district, moreover, has adequately considered race-neutral
means by which to achieve the same end. Accordingly, they are not narrowly
tailored, even conceding a compelling interest.
"QED," as Justice Scalia might say. 54 For opponents of race-conscious
government action, this is shooting fish in a barrel. This is more or less the
line of reasoning that was adopted in the portions of Chief Justice Roberts's
opinion that speak for a majority 55 and Justice Kennedy's concurring
opinion.56
The problem with this analysis is that it takes no account of the proper
role of federal courts with respect to democracy. There is no attempt to
justify judicial intervention on anything that might even generously be
48 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2790-91 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
49 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337.
50 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2790-91 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
51Id. at 2789-90.
52 539 U.S. at 337.
53 Id.
54 Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821 (2008).
55 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2751-54, 2759-67.
56 Id. at 2788-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The portions of the Chief Justice's
opinion that speak only for a plurality of four Justices sweep more broadly, as
explained below.
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termed a theory of the proper role of the federal courts with respect to the
political process. Missing from the majority justices' opinions is any
conception of when the political branches of government can be trusted and
when they cannot be. To be sure, the Court does have a clear and consistent
theory of discrimination: namely, that it encompasses all forms of race-based
differentiation, however well intentioned. But the Court has no theory of
democracy. 57 While none of this is news to those who have followed the
Court's affirmative action cases over the last three decades, the Parents
Involved decision represents the most egregious example of this failure,
given its overruling of decisions made by locally elected school boards that
were perfectly capable of considering-and in fact did consider-the very
arguments successfully pressed by plaintiffs in both cases. To see what the
Court misses, it is useful to examine portions of each of the three opinions
written by Justices in the majority.
I start with the note on which Chief Justice Roberts ends his opinion,
contained in a portion that speaks only for a plurality of justices: "The way
to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the
basis of race." 58 The handiwork of a gifted lawyer, who can easily be
imagined using this as his closing line had he argued the case for Petitioners,
this rhetorical flourish will surely resonate with many readers and is likely to
be the most enduring sentence from the opinion. One prominent and
eloquent defender of the plurality opinion, Judge Harvie Wilkinson, finds
"ringing clarity" in this assertion. 59 But this seemingly unanswerable line
occludes more than it clarifies.
The Chief Justice is using the word variants on "discrimination" to mean
two very different things. In the first clause of the sentence, the word
"discrimination" is used to refer to the districts' stated objectives. These
objectives, however, are less accurately described as "stop[ping]
discrimination" than as providing a racially integrated-or, as the plurality
would prefer to characterize it, "racially balanced" 60 -learning environment
for public school students. Among the ultimate goals of such an environment
is to fulfill Brown's promise-as understood by many people-of
dismantling our persistent racial caste system and thereby serving the
57 This observation has caused one election law scholar to respond, "and be
thankful for small favors." See Daniel H. Lowenstein, The Supreme Court Has No
Theory of Politics-and Be Thankful for Small Favors, in THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 283 (David K. Ryden ed., 2d ed. 2002).
58 127 S. Ct. at 2768.
59 J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Seattle and Louisville School Cases: There Is No
Other Way, 121 HARv. L. REv. 158, 161 (2007).
60 See, e.g., 127 S. Ct. at 2752 n.10, 2780 & 2789.
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principle of anti-subordination. 61 To be sure, this system of racial
subordination is the product of the long history of discrimination, a fact that
the plurality elides. 62 Still, the Chief Justice's characterization of the
districts' objectives is imprecise at best and inaccurate at worst. A better
statement of the districts' objectives would have been "to provide a racially
integrated learning environment," rather than "to stop discrimination on the
basis of race."
The Chief Justice's second mention of discrimination in the sentence is
more accurate, at least in terms of its consistency with case law. The
plurality would require school districts to "stop discriminating on the basis
of race," by which it means "stop making distinctions based on race." This is
consistent with precedent, in that the Court has long defined discrimination
to mean, or at least to include, any and all differentiations based on
race-whether driven by a desire to subordinate a minority group or by a
desire to remedy the effects of past and present racial inequalities. 63 At least
since Croson, a majority of Justices have taken the position that such racial
differentiation is subject to strict scrutiny.64 The last half of Chief Justice
Roberts's sentence, then, is an affirmation that anti-differentiation is the be
all and end all of equal protection.65 If there is ringing clarity in his line, it is
on this point. It is an unmistakable dig at the idea of anti-subordination as an
equal protection principle.
The familiar conflict between these principles, discussed by too many
commentators to name, is not one that is necessary or possible to resolve
here. This deeply rooted conflict is latent in the first Justice Harlan's
memorable statement in Plessy v. Ferguson, invoked in the opinions of the
Chief Justice, 66 Justice Thomas, 67 and Justice Kennedy 68 : "Our
61 See, e.g., Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal
Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1007 (1986).
62 To his credit, Judge Wilkinson laments the fact that the plurality fails to
acknowledge the "tragic elements of the African American experience in this
country." Wilkinson, supra note 59, at 162.
63 Chang & Smith, supra note 44, at 752; Philip C. Aka, The Supreme Court and
Affirmative Action, With Special Reference to the Michigan Cases, 2006 BYU EDUC.
& L.J. 1, 74-81 (2006).
64 See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (plurality opinion), 520 (Scalia, J., concurring).
65 For discussion of the anti-subordination and anti-differentiation theories of
equality, see Colker, supra note 61, at 1005-07. See also Daniel P. Tokaji, First
Amendment Equal Protection: On Discretion, Inequality, and Participation, 101
MICH. L. REV. 2409, 2422-23 (2003) (contrasting colorblindness and
anti-subordination schools of equal protection thought).
66 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2758 n.14.
6 7 Id. at 2782 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among
citizens. 69 Advocates of the anti-differentiation principle place their
emphasis on the first half of the sentence, understanding Justice Harlan to
endorse the view that the Equal Protection Clause commands
raceblindness. 70 They are less likely to focus on the second half of this
sentence, saying that the Constitution "neither knows nor tolerates classes
among citizens." This may be understood as an endorsement of the
anti-subordination principle. The Equal Protection Clause may be
understood as commanding the eradication of all practices that perpetuate
racial subordination. Those who supported the Seattle and Louisville plans
would surely view their programs as designed to serve that end. At the time
that Justice Harlan wrote this dissent, of course, it was not necessary to
choose between the two competing principles implicit in his sentence.
Written during the ascendancy of Jim Crow, the principles of
anti-differentiation and anti-subordination were in sync. Race-based
differentiation on Louisiana railway cars perpetuated the racial caste system;
accordingly, eliminating that differentiation would have served the principle
of anti-subordination. At a time when most southern Blacks had lost the
voting rights that they had gained during Reconstruction, the arguments for
judicial intervention were overwhelming. Blacks in Louisiana and elsewhere
could not protect their interests through the political process.
Parents Involved, unlike Plessy, presents a conflict between the
anti-differentiation and anti-subordination principles-one that the Chief
Justice's artful use of the term "discrimination" suggests without directly
confronting. The question of interest to me here, however, is not which side
has the better of this argument. The real question is why this conflict should
ultimately be resolved by the federal courts, rather than by political
institutions like school boards, state legislatures, or Congress.
One searches the Parents Involved opinions in vain for a compelling
answer to this question. In fact, the opinions of the Chief Justice, Justice
Thomas, and Justice Kennedy all strive mightily to avoid it. In response to
Justice Breyer's concern that the Court demonstrates a lack of "respect for
democratic local decisionmaking by States and school boards," 71 the
plurality chastises him for relying on "dicta" from Swann.72
This misses the force of Justice Breyer's point. As explained in Part I,
68 Id. at 2791 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
69 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
70 See, e.g., 127 S. Ct. at 2782-83 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 2791
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
71 Id. at 2835-36 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
72 Id. at 2762 (Roberts, J., plurality opinion).
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the post-Brown cases' emphasis on local control over school districts is best
understood as rooted in a conception of democracy and the proper role of the
courts in sustaining and constraining it. This is evident not just in Swann, but
also in later cases that limit desegregation remedies.73 In dismissing Justice
Breyer's point with a wave of the hand, the plurality elides the conception of
democracy underlying Brown and later desegregation cases.
Justice Thomas's opinion contains the most forceful answer to the
question of why the Court thinks itself most fit to resolve the conflict in
values between the anti-subordination and anti-differentiation camps. His
opinion expresses the unequivocal conviction that racial differentiation is
inherently noxious and thus prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause. 74
This is best characterized as a "conviction," because it is not supported by
the Fourteenth Amendment's text, post-enactment history, or evidence. The
text of the Constitution mandates equal protection, not raceblindness.
Something more is therefore required to support the conclusion that it means
equal protection should be interpreted to mean raceblindness and nothing
else. Historical developments after the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment provide scant support, given that race-conscious programs for
African Americans were not just tolerated but adopted by Congress. 75 Nor
is there contemporary evidence for the conclusion that all racial
differentiation is noxious. Justice Thomas would apparently demand
uncontroverted social science evidence that racial balancing serves the
interests of Black students in order to sustain it.76 Yet he-and, for that
matter, all of the Justices in the majority--demands no such evidence in
support of those who claim that racial differentiation is inherently harmful.
Missing are the studies establishing that plans like those adopted in Seattle
or Louisville are harmful to students, whether Black, White, Asian, or Latino.
His conviction that race-conscious programs are odious is just that: a
73 See, e.g., Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976); Bd.
of Educ. of Okla. City v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S.
70 (1995).
74 To accept this characterization, one must put aside that Justice Thomas was
willing to put aside his general revulsion to any and all race differentiation when
considering a challenge to racial segregation in California prisons. Johnson v.
California, 543 U.S. 499, 524 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting). In that case, he and
Justice Scalia departed from strict scrutiny and applied a more deferential standard.
Id.
75 See Klarman, supra note 11, at 822; Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and
the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REv. 753, 754,
784-85 (1985).
76 127 S. Ct. at 2776 (noting that "[s]cholars have differing opinions as to
whether educational benefits arise from racial balancing") (Thomas, J., concurring).
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conviction and nothing more.
To his credit, Justice Thomas at least acknowledges the dissent's point
that it should be left to democratically elected institutions to evaluate the
social science evidence and determine whether the benefits of race-conscious
integration outweigh the harms. 77 His response is simply that the decision of
what the Fourteenth Amendment commands is for the Court to decide, not
elected officials: "[I]t would leave our equal-protection jurisprudence at the
mercy of elected government officials evaluating the evanescent views of a
handful of social scientists. '78 This makes perfect sense, if one shares the
conviction that equal protection can mean nothing other than raceblindness,
period. It makes less sense if one understands there to be conflicting equality
values at stake. From this perspective, the question that Justice Thomas's
contention begs is why reconciliation of competing equality norms should be
left to the mercy of unelected judges, in the face of admittedly conflicting
evidence regarding the benefits of race-conscious integration plans.
Toward the end of his opinion, Justice Thomas lambasts policies that
promote racial integration as the product of "faddish social theories" (one
can only wonder whether he has Kenneth Clark's doll experiments cited in
Brown79 in mind) and cautions us to "beware of elites bearing racial
theories. ' '80 The latter remark is particularly inexplicable when one recalls
that the Seattle and Louisville plans were chosen not by "elites" but by local
school boards. This accusation of elitism recalls Romer v. Evans, in which
Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion which asserted
that: "This Court has no business imposing upon all Americans the
resolution favored by the elite class from which the Members of this
institution are selected, pronouncing that 'animosity' toward homosexuality
is evil."' 81 It also recalls the abortion cases, in which Justice Thomas
similarly views the Court's Justices as substituting their own policy
preferences for those of democratically elected bodies.82 Whatever currency
77 Id. at 2778.
78 Id.
79 347 U.S. 483, 495 n.1 1 (1954). For further discussion of Clark's doll
experiments and the Brown Court's reliance on them, see RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE
JUSTICE 315-29, 705-06 (1975).
80 127 S. Ct. at 2787 (Thomas, J., concurring).
81 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
82 This calls to mind Justice Scalia's dissent in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, in
which Justice Thomas joined, which concluded:
[B]y foreclosing all democratic outlet for the deep passions this issue arouses, by
banishing the issue from the political forum that gives all participants, even the
losers, the satisfaction of a fair hearing and an honest fight, by continuing the
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railing at elites may have in the context of gay rights or abortion, it is
completely out of place in Parents Involved. It is the Court, after all, that
overrides the balancing of competing values chosen by democratically
elected decisionmakers, based upon the majority Justices' conviction that
racial differentiation is inherently noxious.
Justice Kennedy's opinion strikes the most moderate tone of the majority
Justices. 83 For the most part, it fairly applies the "narrow tailoring" prong of
strict scrutiny, in keeping with the precedent-based argument that I described
earlier. In particular, his analysis hones in on a defect in each of the plans
considered, judged from the standpoint of strict scrutiny. The Louisville plan,
he concludes, is too "broad and imprecise [to] withstand strict scrutiny"
given the lack of clarity as to how and when race was being employed.84
One may disagree with this characterization, as Justice Breyer does, 85 while
still acknowledging that a lack of precise standards necessarily gives
officials discretion that may sometimes allow racial bias to enter in. 86 As for
Seattle's plan, Justice Kennedy describes the defect as its "crude racial
categories" of White and non-White, in a district with substantial White,
African American, Asian-American, and Latino populations.87 It is no great
stretch to find that such a plan flunks the narrow tailoring standard, as
articulated in prior cases. 88 In reaching this conclusion, Justice Kennedy
demonstrates a greater sensitivity than the other majority Justices to the
interests that the districts seek to serve, while taking the view that
race-conscious mechanisms should only be used as the "last resort. '89 But in
the end, his opinion also rests on the belief that racial distinctions are
"pernicious,"9  without explaining why this judgment-and the weighing of
imposition of a rigid national rule instead of allowing for regional differences, the
Court merely prolongs and intensifies the anguish.
505 U.S. 833, 1002 (1992).
83 For a discussion of the roots of Justice Kennedy's seemingly more moderate
views on race in Parents Involved, see Heather K. Gerken, Justice Kennedy and the
Domains of Equal Protection, 121 HARV. L. REV. 104 (2007).
84 127 S. Ct. at 2789-90 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
85 Id. at 2820-30 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (concluding that plans satisfy strict
scrutiny).
86 See Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection, supra note 65, at 2453.
87 127 S. Ct. at 2790.
88 See Croson, 488 U.S. at 506 (finding fault with Richmond's contracting
preference for Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, and Aleut persons when
there was no evidence of past discrimination against these groups).
89 127 S. Ct. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
90Id. at 2796.
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any harms against the benefits of race-conscious action-should be made by
the federal courts rather than elected school boards.
At bottom, then, all three of the majority Justices' opinions rest on a
conviction that racial distinctions are noxious. There is undeniable
precedential support for the equation differentiation = discrimination =
(presumptive) constitutional violation. The question that all the majority
opinions avoid is why the competing visions of racial equality are better
resolved by the federal courts than by democratically elected bodies in
Seattle, Louisville, and elsewhere. Though grounded in affirmative action
precedents, the majority's conclusion is unmoored in any coherent
conception of the federal judiciary's proper role in a democracy.
III. DEMOCRACY
What might a coherent understanding of the federal courts' proper role
in a democracy look like? Though I will not attempt a comprehensive answer
to this question in this Essay, it would at least entail an explanation of the
circumstances in which elected bodies can and cannot be trusted. It would
focus on both the inputs and the outputs of the democratic process. By inputs,
I mean to include barriers to participation, representation, or governance.
These could include anti-competitive redistricting practices or campaign
funding rules. 91 It might take into consideration barriers to pluralistic
bargaining, such as bias against groups defined by race or sexual orientation,
that distort the ordinary political process. To the extent that there are defects
in the inputs of the democratic process, related outputs of that process-the
laws or policies enacted by elected bodies affecting these groups-would
warrant closer scrutiny.
The ingredients of fair process sketched out in the preceding paragraph
are undeniably value-laden and deeply contestable. My point here is not to
argue for or against any particular conception of a fair democratic process. It
is not, for example, to argue that the Court should engage in searching
review of campaign finance regulations that disadvantage challengers, 92
alleged partisan gerrymanders, 93 or voter identification laws that may
91 See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan
Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 649 (1998) (suggesting
that courts should "destabilize political lockups in order to protect the competitive
vitality of the electoral process and facilitate more responsive representation").
92 See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 231-34 (2006) (striking down
Vermont's contribution limits, partly on the ground that they inhibit challengers and
therefore stymie electoral competition).
93 See LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 403 (2006) (declining to hold Texas's
mid-decade redistricting an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander).
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exclude eligible voters. 94 It is instead to suggest that questions about the
fairness of the democratic process ought to be central in determining how
closely to scrutinize the products of that process. Where certain individuals
or groups are prevented from participating as equals, the argument for
judicial intervention is stronger.
In addition to the cases described in Part I, the significance of the
availability of democratic channels for securing educational equality is
evident in two cases that protected desegregation efforts. The first is Justice
Rehnquist's in-chambers opinion in Bustop, Inc. v. Board of Education of
City of Los Angeles, in which he rejected a request to stay a state court order
requiring the race-conscious reassignment of some 60,000 students in the
Los Angeles Unified School District.95 Justice Rehnquist's brief opinion
rejects the "novel" argument that there was a federal right to be free from
race-conscious student assignments, remarking: "While I have the gravest
doubts that the Supreme Court of California was required by the United
States Constitution to take the action that it has taken in this case, I have
very little doubt that it was permitted by that Constitution to take such
action." 96 There was no need for federal judicial intervention, because in
this circumstance, California's democratic processes could be trusted. To be
sure, the desegregation remedy in Bustop was issued by a state court
enforcing state law, rather than being voluntarily adopted by a local school
board.97 The implication, however, is that state and local political processes
could be trusted, obviating the need for federal judicial intervention. If the
people of California disliked the interpretation given to state law by the
state's supreme court, then they were free to amend that law. 98 That is in
fact what happened. The postscript to Bustop is that the voters of California
ultimately did choose to change the requirements of California's constitution,
so as to limit the circumstances under which race-conscious desegregation
remedies were required. 99
The other opinion emphasizing respect for the ability of democratically
elected bodies to choose desegregation remedies is Washington v. Seattle
School District, No. 1, in which the Court struck down a Washington
initiative that effectively barred democratically elected bodies from adopting
94 See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1615 (2008)
(upholding Indiana law requiring photo identification to vote).
95 439 U.S. 1380, 1380 (1978).
96 1d. at 1383.
97 1d. at 1380.
98 CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7.
99 The Supreme Court upheld this initiative constitutional amendment in
Crawfordv. Bd of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 545 (1982).
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race-conscious busing for the purpose of addressing de facto segregation.100
This initiative was enacted in response to a voluntary desegregation program
adopted in Seattle, by the same school district from which Parents Involved
would later emerge.' 0 ' The district challenged the initiative, and the Court
concluded that the state's initiative unlawfully burdened racial minorities'
access to the political process.' 0 2 After Washington's initiative, Blacks
seeking desegregative busing-alone among all constituents of local school
boards-were prevented from going to their elected representatives to seek
beneficial legislation. 10 3 The Court found this imposition on local control
unconstitutional, because it restricted a particular racial group's access to the
political process. 10 4 What the Court found most dispositive in Washington v.
Seattle School District, No. 1, was that the state initiative distorted the
ordinary political process, preventing those favoring desegregation from
going to their local school boards seeking a remedy.10 5
At first glance, Bustop and Washington v. Seattle School District may
seem to cut in opposite directions. While Bustop affirms a state's authority
over subordinate local entities, Washington holds that there are limits upon a
state's ability to dictate to those local entities.' 0 6 At the heart of both these
cases, however, is a respect for fair democratic processes through which
appropriate remedies for de facto segregation might be selected and
implemented. 10 7 Where those processes are equally open to all comers, as in
Bustop, there is less reason for federal judicial intervention. But where those
processes are constricted, so as to shut governmental doors to certain claims
for relief, as in Washington v. Seattle School District, No. 1, there is a
100 458 U.S. 457, 470 (1982).
10 ' Id. at 460-61.
102 Id. at 470.
10 3 Id. at 462-64.
104 Id. at 470.
105 This was the key distinction between this case and Crawford, decided the
same day. The California initiative upheld in Crawford did not restrict anyone's
access to the ordinary political process; it only limited the remedies that courts could
issue under the state constitution. See Daniel P. Tokaji & Mark D. Rosenbaum,
Promoting Equality by Protecting Power: A Neo-Federalist Challenge to State
Affirmative Action Bans, 10 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 129, 136 (1999). By contrast,
under the initiative struck down in Washington v. Seattle School District, those
seeking remedies for de facto segregation could no longer approach their local school
boards seeking a remedy.
106 See id. at 135-37; Barron, supra note 42, at 569-71.
107 In referring to "fair" political processes, I mean to exclude the extraordinary
process that racial minorities were forced to undergo in order to achieve beneficial
legislation, under the initiative struck down in Washington v. Seattle School District.
2008]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
compelling argument for federal judicial intervention.
What is striking about Parents Involved is the complete failure of the
majority Justices to ask such questions. This failure is deeply rooted in the
Supreme Court's discrimination cases. In its cases regarding race-conscious
government action, the last serious effort at a process-based explanation for
heightened scrutiny appears in Croson.10 8 Writing for a plurality, Justice
O'Connor partly justified the Court's decision to apply strict scrutiny to
Richmond's affirmative action program on the ground that Blacks
constituted half of that city's population:
Even were we to accept a reading of the guarantee of equal protection
under which the level of scrutiny varies according to the ability of different
groups to defend their interests in the representative process, heightened
scrutiny would still be appropriate in the circumstances of this case. One of
the central arguments for applying a less exacting standard to "benign"
racial classifications is that such measures essentially involve a choice made
by dominant racial groups to disadvantage themselves. If one aspect of the
judiciary's role under the Equal Protection Clause is to protect "discrete and
insular minorities" from majoritarian prejudice or indifference, see United
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938), some
maintain that these concerns are not implicated when the "white majority"
places burdens upon itself See J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust 170 (1980).
In this case, blacks constitute approximately 50% of the population of
the city of Richmond. Five of the nine seats on the city council are held by
Blacks. The concern that a political majority will more easily act to the
disadvantage of a minority based on unwarranted assumptions or incomplete
facts would seem to militate for, not against, the application of heightened
judicial scrutiny in this case. See Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse
Discrimination, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 723, 739 n. 58 (1974).109
By the time of Adarand, however, this rationale for heightened scrutiny
had disappeared. The Court applied strict scrutiny to a federal
race-conscious affirmative action program, despite the fact that it benefitted
numerical minorities while burdening the White majority. 110 The Court
108 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
109 Id. at 495-496.
110 515 U.S. 200, 227 & 235 (1995). See Brian Boynton, Democracy and
Distrust After Twenty Years: Ely's Process Theory and Constitutional Law from
1990 to 2000, 53 STAN. L. REv. 397, 439 (2000) ("The outcome in Croson is
consistent with Ely's position because, under his theory, laws benefiting the class of
people to which the people who wrote them belong are suspect. Adarand, however, is
a different story entirely.").
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likewise applied strict scrutiny in Grutter111 and Gratz,112 without pausing
to consider the ability of the burdened group to protect its interests through
the political process.
In this respect, the affirmative action cases may be distinguished from
the "racial gerrymandering" cases starting with Shaw v. Reno. Although
Shaw and its progeny do rely in part on the raceblindness principle
articulated in Bakke and its progeny, the Shaw Court was also partly
motivated by its concern with the U.S. Department of Justice's use of its
preclearance power to compel the creation of majority-minority districts. 113
The Court's motivation became even more clear in Miller v. Johnson, in
which the Court more explicitly took aim at the Justice Department's policy
of requiring the "maximization" of majority-minority districts.114 Whether
or not one agrees with the Court's characterization or criticism of the Justice
Department, there can be no mistaking the fact that Shaw and its progeny are
driven in part by a distrust of the executive branch's institutional capacity to
exercise its preclearance power evenhandedly. 115 That is not to say that
Shaw or the cases that followed were correctly decided; only that there was a
conception of democratic politics, and the Court's proper role in policing it,
embedded in these decisions.
In contrast, the Court's affirmative action decisions since Croson
demonstrate little regard for whether democratic institutions may be trusted
to make these decisions. Absent a change in personnel, the Court's basic
approach in these cases seems unlikely to change. What does this mean for
those interested in promoting integrated public schools and, more broadly,
equal educational opportunities? The best for which advocates of
progressive educational reform can reasonably hope from the federal courts
is that they will stay out. It is democratic institutions of local, state, and
111 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).
112 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003).
113 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). See Tokaji, The Story of Shaw v. Reno,
supra note 25, at 521-22.
114 515 U.S. 900, 921-27 (1995).
115 See Daniel P. Tokaji, If It's Broke, Fix It: Improving Voting Rights
Preclearance, 49 How. L.J. 785, 803 (2006). One explanation for this distrust is that,
during the presidency of George H.W. Bush, "[p]olitical appointees within the Justice
Department were delighted to pack pro-Democratic minority voters into new
majority-minority districts, thereby drawing them away from the electoral strength of
Democratic incuments." SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY:
LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLrICAL PROCESS 908 (2d ed. 2001); see also Tokaji,
49 How. L.J. at 801-04 (discussing allegations of partisan manipulation of the
Justice Department's preclearance power in the 1990s, and the Court's reaction to it
in the Shaw line of cases).
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federal government that provide the most promising avenues for reform.
One possibility is to pursue federal legislation that would promote
integrated public schools.' 16 Through the use of its Spending Clause power,
Congress might try to create incentives for local and state authorities to
promote integrated learning environments. While Parents Involved surely
makes this more difficult, Justice Kennedy's opinion suggests several
race-neutral possibilities and leaves the door open (if only slightly) to
race-conscious programs if those are unavailing. 117 Local boards are sure to
be Wary of adopting programs that would invite litigation, but Congress
could help by adopting a carrot-and-stick approach. The carrot would be a
cooperative federal-state-local relationship, through which Congress would
provide funding and assistance as an incentive to cash-strapped districts that
would like to integrate their schools while minimizing the risks of liability. It
might further provide guidance or even legal assistance to jurisdictions that
want to alleviate racially isolated schools.
A possible stick is to strengthen Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,118 by providing a cause of action for students in districts with racially
isolated schools. As long as such a claim is tied to a district's receipt of
federal funds, and does not require it to adopt plans that violate the
Constitution, such legislation is likely to be upheld. Another potential
amendment to Title VI is to prohibit states from giving effect to laws like
California's Proposition 209 and Michigan's Proposal 2 that impose state
constitutional bans on race-based "preferential treatment." 119 These laws
have clauses providing that they should not be interpreted to require action
that is necessary to maintain federal funds. 120 Were Congress to pass
legislation prohibiting states from giving effect to these laws as a condition
of receiving federal funds, it could effectively preempt measures banning
race-conscious decision-making in public or higher education.
These possibilities are merely intended as suggestive. The key point is
that the Court's decision in Parents Involved will force advocates for equal
educational opportunity to think creatively. If the federal courts were once
viewed as saviors and elected officials as barriers to educational reform,
those roles have now flipped. Hope for integrated learning environments and
equal educational equalities, at least for the foreseeable future, lies primarily
in democratic politics.
1 16 Lia B. Epperson, True Integration: Advancing Brown's Goal of Educational
Equity in the Wake of Grutter, 67 U. Prrr. L. REv. 175, 212 n.183 (2005).
117 127 S. Ct. at 2792-93, 2796 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
118 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d et seq.
119 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(a); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26(1).
120 See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 3 1(e); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26(4).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Justice Jackson was right. Decisions about whether to override the
decisions of elected officials should depend, at least in part, on an
assessment of whether there has been some failure in representative
democracy. This does not mean that "it is the majority who will determine
what the constitutional rights of the majority are," as Justice Jackson's
then-law clerk William Rehnquist wrote. 121 There unquestionably had been
a failure of democracy in the decades that preceded Brown, and the denial
and dilution of African Americans' voting rights for years afterwards
justified the Court's ongoing intervention. By contrast, there is no arguable
democratic failure that should cause courts to look with suspicion on the
policies that emerged from the Seattle and Louisville school boards. The
Court's failure to justify its intervention on democratic grounds is rooted in
its discrimination cases since Croson and has become a fixture of the Court's
approach to race-conscious programs, whatever their motivation. We can
only hope that the fate that the young William Rehnquist quite wrongly
predicted for Brown will befall Parents Involved and the line of cases on
which it rests: that they will "fade in time ... as embodying only the
sentiments of a transient majority of nine men [and women]."'1 22
121 Memorandum from William H. Rehnquist to Justice Robert Jackson, A
Random Thought on the Segregation Cases (1952), reprinted in 117 CONG. REC.
45,440-45.
122Id. See Snyder, supra note 1, at 879.
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